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A B S T R A C T
Accounting for the rise of the medical device industry in the Emilia-Romagna town of Mirandola from a once
depressed agricultural area in 1962 to a world-manufacturing center for dialysis equipment and disposable
plastic medical devices, requires in large measure mapping the methods of the local entrepreneur who spear-
headed its development. Reworking Agrawal and Cockburn's anchor-tenant hypothesis highlighting the role of
large organizations in fostering agglomerations, this paper privileges the Schumpeterian entrepreneur as the
dynamic force driving new industrial formations. This anchor-entrepreneur with no prior experience in manu-
facturing medical devices and without any public financing or large private backers founded six firms. Each of
these would be sold off fairly quickly to a different large multinational corporation. Placing the anchor-en-
trepreneur at the center stage advances understanding of early industry evolution, spelling out how first-mover
pioneers shape the environment to establish the first markets needed to attract new resources and capabilities.
Underpinning our argument are 61 fine-grain interviews with key medical device industry informants in addi-
tion to extensive secondary sources and historical records. We draw on this material to induce a stylized model of
anchor-entrepreneurship and industry catalysis that rests on three generative processes: bricolage, second-hand
imprinting and beaconing.
1. Introduction
How does one resurrect an economically depressed town? One
blessed with good farmland and abundant water, but without the right
combination of competitive manufacturing inputs and resources. And
burdened by skeletal public transport and bad roads, made worse by
late autumn's and winter's dense fogs that blanket the land, isolating it
from major population, scientific and research centers. With only a
modest sixteenth-century palace of the celebrated Renaissance poly-
math Giovanni Pico, not even tourists had good reasons to stop there.
Counting just five small factories – a sugar refinery, a maker of school-
bus frames, an industrial-biscuit bakery, a manufacturer of curtains and
a firm producing plows - back in the early 1960s Mirandola, a pro-
vincial Modena town marking the northeastern confines of Emilia
Romagna southeast of the Po River, did not appear to have a bright
economic future. But less than a decade later it had earned a spot as one
of the world's leading manufacturing centers for extracorporeal-blood
and oxygen-medical devices and for kidney-dialysis machines. Today
approximately one-fifth of Italy's medical-device firms call it home,
accounting for about thirty percent of the nation's industry revenues.
We try to solve this puzzle of industry emergence in a region where
the requisite building blocks defined by neoclassical economics were
nowhere to be found. Figuring large in this puzzle of Mirandola's in-
dustrial genesis is Mario Veronesi, a Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who
in 1962 from his parents’ home garage started assembling simple
medical kits made of nontoxic disposal plastic tubing for blood tests and
transfusions. By establishing primal markets in labor, material inputs
and services, he laid the foundations for a burgeoning industry that
would form the embryo of a dynamic medical-devices manufacturing
center. As much as Veronesi unquestionably transformed Mirandola
from a rural backwater into an internationally recognized medical-de-
vice cluster, ours is not an account praising muscular, purposive, in-
strumental behavior (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Rather as we will
recount many of Veronesi's successes came accidentally, a result of
serendipity, being present at the dawn of an emerging medical field that
married knowledge about renal and cardiac treatment to improved
plastics. A time when large multinationals not only offered relatively
rudimentary technology, but were still largely absent from the medical-
device marketplace. It was a historical moment allowing bold in-
novators like Veronesi to seize the initiative. So random factors like
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chance and entrepreneurial optimism, which Storey (2011) says ex-
plains why some new ventures succeed while most don't, helped Ver-
onesi progress. But the blessings of randomness and serendipity that
occasionally give birth to new industries at unexpected times and places
- what David (1985: 332) and Krugman (1991: 156) have dismissed as
“historical accidents”- must not dissuade social scientists from ex-
ploring how these events inform a process account of industry emer-
gence. And in our example this emergence began with an ancestral
founder whose primordial economic actions set off cascading effects
within a defined geographic space, awakening the animal spirits of both
neophyte and seasoned economic actors by signaling unimagined pos-
sibilities of wealth creation and development.
Central to our explanation is the anchor-entrepreneur. In our re-
formulated use the anchor-entrepreneur (hereinafter anchor) performs
a generative role across multiple phases and processes to ignite eco-
nomic change. Phase 1 is genesis; the moment when the anchor con-
ceives and formulates an idea calling for economic action. But lacking
the requisite inputs and resources to realize it, he engages in bricolage;
what the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1967) identified as
“making do with what's on hand”. Challenged to make a new product
unsupported by any specialized markets (Aldrich, 2010) or even re-
ferences to existing models compelled Veronesi to take chances, ex-
periment and learn from errors (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2013). Starting
with assembling plastic, nontoxic parts and tubes to make customized,
drug-infusion kits ordered by hospitals, his little start-up took on
making more sophisticated devices for blood tests, transfusions, and
drip lines. Gaining both new skills and customers for his expanding
range of customized, plastic-medical devices, Veronesi found himself
thrust into experimenting with manufacturing kidney dialyzers, com-
prising not only plastic tubing but also electronic, electrical and me-
chanical components. Veronesi's ingenuity resided not in inventiveness
- in the early stages others had developed the materials, tools and
techniques used – but in harnessing a diverse network of physicians,
hands-on technicians and scientists to help with bricolage: re-
engineering, reworking and altering the work products of others to the
challenges at hand (Stark, 1996; Baker and Nelson, 2005; Baker, 2007).
Phase 2 of our story is expansion; the transition from individual-
level learning to organizational-level outcomes. Here simple en-
trepreneurial heuristics (Manimala, 1992) – i.e. “articulated and often
informal rules-of-thumb” - pioneered by the anchor are assimilated by
early team members, instigating organizational reproduction
(Phillips, 2002; Klepper, 2007). Central to this phase is second-hand
imprinting; the process of “the social transmission of imprints”
(Tilsick, 2014, p. 641) by which actors assimilate elements of an an-
chor's imprint. Inherent in second-hand imprinting are the genealogical
ramifications triggered by the anchor via team members-turned-foun-
ders following early exposure to the anchor's entrepreneurial actions
and decisions (Stuart and Ding, 2006; Ferriani et al., 2012;
Feldman et al., 2019). Second-hand imprinting sustains imprints across
subsequent generations of firms.
Phase 3 is attraction, and here beaconing is the underlying gen-
erative process that occurs once anchors reap exceptional and salient
rewards observed by other entrepreneurs and resource-holders
(Bermiss et al., 2017). Beaconing also stimulates emulation effects,
especially in a clearly demarcated geographical region where not only
the quality and saliency of information exchange is frequently greatest,
but where network effects increase the likelihood that others will
emulate the anchor (Bermiss et al., 2017; Markusen, 2003). To sum up,
a single anchor may exercise multiplier effects on regional development
and business formation and thereby thrust the industry into the lime-
light.
We add empirical flesh to these processes with strategic research
material (Merton, 1987) that parses the medical-device industry's ori-
gins in Mirandola. Starting with a conceptual agenda, we rely on evi-
dence that sharpens, illustrates and grounds our arguments. Then we
weave these arguments together to show how entrepreneurial action
catalyzes industry emergence. In placing Mario Veronesi at the fore-
front of this model, we take up Aldrich and Fiol's (1994, p. 666) chal-
lenge: “The social construction of organizational reality involved in
building a new industry requires meaning making on a grand scale, and
we suspect that those entrepreneurs who do it well are obsessed with
the process. As such, they make fascinating subjects of study”. By
spotlighting a pioneering entrepreneur's catalytic role in spawning a
new industry, we hope to both enrich and stimulate current debates on
the early evolution of industries (Aldrich, 2010; Alvarez et al., 2015;
Agarwal et al., 2017).
2. Conceptual background
Mapping and pinpointing the processes underlying novelty emer-
gence – the germination of ideas, forms, fields, and industries - occupies
a central place within organizational theory (Padgett and
Powell, 2012). But paradoxically scholars, no matter their theoretical
perspective, also agree how so much of that space still remains un-
explored1. Reviewing the existing literature reveals different theoretical
responses to the question of industrial emergence. Industry-lifecycle
models advance a stylized evolutionary pattern that demonstrates va-
lidity across a variety of industries. The pattern contains various stages:
an early quasi-monopoly period of a handful of firms; a growth stage
marked by accelerated firm entry; a shakeout stage of firms suddenly
exiting; and finally a mature stage (Gort, 1982). But with notably rare
exceptions the lifecycle model essentially recounts histories of well-
established firms, while indifferent to new firms struggling with in-
novative products that are saddled unavoidably with the costs of trial
and error (Moeen and Agarwal, 2017). All this leaves our knowledge
about economic action at the dawn of industry formation diminished
(Agarwal et al., 2017). Organizational ecology, on the other hand, with
its traditional, expansive temporal scale does offer a compelling ac-
count of collective patterns of activity that determine the vitality of
existing firm populations (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1986). But by
restricting data analysis to the population level, it buries crucial micro-
level economic action such as improvisation, bricolage, and re-
combination, precisely the kinds of economic action that seed em-
bryonic organizations (e.g., Stark 1996; Johnson 2007; Powell and
Sandholtz 2012).
Social movement theory compensates for a few of population ecol-
ogy's blind spots by photographing the actions of under-resourced
challengers or well-heeled incumbents (Hiatt et al., 2009;
Pacheco et al., 2014). But as much as it elucidates emergent mechan-
isms in established fields where dissatisfied activists challenge the
status quo, it abandons at the wayside emerging ones, where shared
interests, power relations, and coalitions have yet to gel (David et al.,
2013). Institutional analysis has been reinforced by actor-centric ex-
planations that acknowledge the generative power of pioneering en-
trepreneurs and highlight micro-level processes of organization-
1 Take for instance Aldrich: “The period during which a new industry emerges
deserves more theoretical attention” (1999, pp. 256–258). Or Powell, Packalen
& Whittington (2012: 434) who analogize the social science treatment of new
institutional forms to a bizarre play that begins with the second act, confronting
the audience with a mindboggling challenge to make sense of a narrative and a
plot neither explained nor developed: “Very little research asks how a play
comes to be performed.” Greenwood et al (2008, p. 26) in a similar vein note
that “institutional studies have not been overly concerned with how institutions
arise.” In a recent study of Israel’s information, communication and technology
(ICT) industries, Ellis et al. (Ellis, Aharonson, Drori, and Shapira, 2017, p. 519)
lament how “studies of industry evolution tend to consider industries as given,
and dismiss the dynamics leading to the emergence of new industries.”
Although Stinchcombe (1968) rightly recognized how organizations bearing
the congealed imprint of their history recall the timeless words of King Solomon
in Ecclesiastics that “there is nothing new under the sun,” from time to time
novel exceptions merit attention.
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building, which escaped early neoinstitutional work. Yet institutional
entrepreneurship suffers from its own blind spots. By highlighting in-
tentionality such explanations tend to rely on teleological categories
such as power or superior skills to explain outcomes, overlooking how
most actors lack either the capacity to change or create fields
(Garud et al., 2007; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Commenting on this
failure, Clemens and Cook (1999: 460) warned, “to appreciate human
agency, we should beware of assuming every actor a Cosimo de
Medici.” Despite institutional entrepreneurship's worthy attention to
agency and institutional change, “it has had limited focus on how en-
trepreneurs pursuing wealth creating opportunities contribute to the
origin and emergence of new institutions” (Alvarez et al., 2015, p. 97).
In short, the institutional approach may be better for observing change
in existing entities than for capturing those fleeting moments at the
break of day when an industry's first stirrings become visibile
(Aldrich, 2010; Forbes and Kirsch, 2011).
To sum up, each of the above macro-, meso-, and micro-levels ap-
proaches of social analysis contribute complementary and compelling
insights into the birth of new industries. Nevertheless, the methodolo-
gical and theoretical limitations of each approach severely circum-
scribes its contribution to knowlege (Garud et al., 2007; Powell and
Johnson, 2017). Most conspicuously none of these perspectives regis-
ters those moments when the economic actions of a pioneer unin-
tentionally spark a new industry. Something that may occur without
any of the requisite preconditions: no launch-ready product; no col-
lective patterns of vigorous activity; no distributed mobilization; and no
farsighted-purposive vision. In the following sections addressing Mir-
andola's puzzle, we offer an account of industry emergence where
pioneering entrepreneurs trigger ambiguous generative processes
whose societal ramifications are largely unintended, even when they
are products of individual initiative. In detailing these processes, we
develop a stylized, conceptual model of entrepreneurial action cata-
lyzing large-scale transformation through industry emergence.
3. Research design and method
To explore the emerging field of how agency spawns nascent eco-
nomic organizations we chose a longitudinal case study (Van de
Ven, 2007; Yin, 2009). Thanks to the medical-device industry's rela-
tively small size and short history in Mirandola, our fine-grain account
included most of the key firms and actors. Further aiding our inquiry,
most of the original founders including Mario Veronesi were alive
during data collection; some still were even involved in the industry.
The city's relative geographic isolation reinforced by its cultural parti-
cularism, the strong local identity of its population and an enterprise
structure dominated by a dense medical-device network all contributed
to making Mirandola a good “strategic research site” (Merton, 1987) by
“bounding our phenomenon of interest in a tractable manner”
(Chiles et al., 2004: 503). The bounded nature of our subject matter
with few confounding factors helped restrict extraneous variances,
yielding a high “signal to noise ratio”. Next we illustrate the research
context, the data and the analytic strategy.
3.1. Context
Mirandola certainly was no Robinson Crusoe island: It had power,
water, sewers, and healthcare; several small workshops run by skilled
machinists; and state-enforced property rights. After the new autostrada
opened in 1962, Milan could be reached in about three-to-four hours,
and a few years later the newly opened A22 high-speed, toll road finally
linked Mirandola to central Europe, even if modern access roads have
yet to be constructed. In any case, persistently poor road and rail in-
frastructure – still little improved by 2020 – along with Italy's high
petrol and road charges have long put the regional capital of Bologna - a
fifty-to-eighty-minutes' commute – beyond the labor-market catchment
area. Moreover, particularistic Italian family and cultural factors to this
day constrain geographic-labor mobility. Modena, the provincial ca-
pital - forty-five minutes away - has long been home to engineering and
medical schools, but their faculty never collaborated with Mirandola's
medical-device industry, feeling doing so brought no professional re-
wards. Indeed Dr. Spolvieri the lone exception who helped Veronesi
perfect the oxygenator, was a visiting professor from Rome. Medical
schools and hospitals did help Veronesi develop the kidney dialyzer, but
they were not located in Emilia-Romagna.
In 1962 when Mario Veronesi opened his start-up, the country's
relatively low-labor costs did provide Mirandola a competitive ad-
vantage compared to most other European countries. But by the early
1970s Italian-union militancy and above-average inflation had eroded
any cost advantages. Nevertheless, twenty-five years after Veronesi's
first start-up, Mirandola had become home to no less than five multi-
nationals, placing it third in world manufacturing for hemodialysis
products and other disposable, plastic-medical devices.2 An additional
eighty-to-ninety-small - to medium-sized firms furnishing either aux-
iliary and subcontracting services for the multinationals or else making
niche products completes the picture. Taken together these firms em-
ploy approximately 5000 people and generate 1.5 billion Euro in rev-
enues. How then to explain Mirandola's puzzling success?
3.2. Data
Primary data. Initially assisted by the local industrial association and
the personal connections of one of the authors, who has tracked this
industry for almost 30 years (Lorenzoni, 1988; Lazerson and
Lorenzoni, 1999, 2016), we pursued a snowball approach, interviewing
new informants until we started confirming our existing information.
We ended up with thirty-four key informants from multiple groups:
local firm-founders and entrepreneurs, multinational managers, re-
presentatives of various local trade associations, trade journals, pub-
licly-financed groups and even the curator of Mirandola's Biomedical
Museum, an engineer and former entrepreneur. Key informants were
interviewed multiple times resulting in 61 semi-structured interviews
lasting from forty minutes to several hours each.3 All face-to-face in-
terviews were tape-recorded and transcribed; if necessary follow up
telephone calls were made to clarify ambiguities or obtain updates.4
The interview questions focused on the participant’s actual in-
volvement in and knowledge of the medical-device industry and espe-
cially his or her relationship with Mario Veronesi. Because many of our
informants were both industry pioneers and Veronesi's collaborators,
we concentrated on stories about the origins, processes and outcomes of
their entrepreneurial efforts. Interviews with the managing directors of
the multinational plants were asked not only why their firms settled in
Mirandola, but why they remained, wanting comparisons with any of
their worldwide-production sites. We also explored relationships be-
tween multinationals and locally owned firms. To correct for any un-
conscious interviewer bias, facilitate collective learning, and add fur-
ther depth, in the beginning two of the authors interviewed
approximately one-fifth of the respondents. After completing a tentative
semi-structured interview protocol but open to exploring any new,
promising channels of inquiry, one author completed most of the
2 Counting buyouts, mergers and spinoffs the multinationals that have in-
vested in Mirandola at some point is a Who's Who of the giants of the medical
device industry: Sandoz, Rhône-Poulenc, Hospal-Dasco, Gambro, Pfizer, Baxter-
Travenol, Tyco-Mallinckrodt, Covidien, Medtronic, Fresenius, B.Braun, Snia-
Viscosa, Sorin.
3 All our interviewees gave their informed consent to participate in the study
and authorized full disclosure of their names.
4 In the course of data collection, we made multiple visits to Mirandola ex-
tending over a period of ten years, affording direct exposure to the local milieu
(culture, institutions, foundations, etc.). We attended several congresses and
local regional development conferences. We visited Mirandola's biomedical
museum as well as private and public industry associations and consortia.
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remaining interviews. Appendix D lists the interview respondents and
their position when interviewed, prior relevant roles and the number of
interviews.
Secondary data. In addition to primary data, we collected archival
data through keyword searchers of archival sources, including news-
papers, press kits, websites, reports, university theses. Other archival
sources include scholarly articles and cases on the industry, as well as
Chamber of Commerce publications, industry reports from Mirandola's
medical-device associations and biographies. Finally, via audio-video
files we accessed six interviews of Mirandola's original founders con-
ducted by others between 2010 and 2015. Including the sixty-one in-
terviews we conducted, we had access to 67 interviews. Triangulating
multiple-data sources helped uncover key events, their sequencing,
their interactions and cumulative effects, while mitigating the risks of
retrospectively imposing meaning on events because of our knowledge
of outcomes (Golden, 1992). Taking the interviews, the documents, and
the secondary data together resulted in a nuanced and textured un-
derstanding of the dynamics that shaped the industry's early develop-
ment. As noted by Lippmann and Aldrich (2016, p. 662): “Historical
analyses of such pioneering entrepreneurs and their firms can help us
understand the evolutionary forces behind transformational social and
economic change.” In presenting our findings, we cite archival sources
parenthetically, using numbers that correspond to a detailed list in
Appendix E. Table 1 summarizes our archival sources.
3.3. Data analysis
Our data produced a robust chronology of the genesis and early
development of Mirandola's medical-device industry from 1962, the
date of the first founding, until the late nineties, when we terminated
our historical account. Fig. 1 provides a chronology of both the major
events during the first thirty years of Mirandola's medical-device in-
dustry and of the annual opening of new medical-device firms. Our
analytical approach employs a temporal, bracketing strategy
(Langley, 1999) that decomposes into three successive and discrete
phases the chronological data of the emergence and early evolution of
the industry: genesis, expansion and attraction. These phases do not
imply any predictable sequential process, but rather offer an illustrative
heuristic that highlights and sharpens distinctive patterns
(Langley 1999, p. 703). The boundaries separating these three periods
can be loosely defined by significant changes in the evolutionary tra-
jectory of the industry. Specifically, these phases allow the constitution
of comparative units of analysis for the exploration of theoretical ideas
(Denis et al., 1996). By analyzing the evidence, revising the emerging
concepts, and iteratively returning to the data, we refined key con-
structs and organized them into a stylized model of anchor-based in-
dustry catalysis.
4. Findings
The three stylized phases of genesis, expansion and attraction, de-
riving from the emergence and development of Mirandola's medical-
device industry, present a particular evolutionary pattern. For each
phase, the generative processes and developments have been situated
within a larger chronology to better grasp the underlying dynamics
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). Illustrative quotes, decisions and prac-
tices are contained throughout the paper and in a greater detail in
Appendix A.
Table 1
Secondary data sources.
Data source Details
Published articles, comments, commentaries on Mirandola's
biomedical industry
Articles and commentaries published in the business/trade press and online blogs accessed from databases such
as ABI/INFORM Global, Factiva, ProQuest and through extensive Google searches. Scholarly articles on
Mirandola's biomedical industry downloaded through keyword searches of ProQuest, JSTOR and Google
Scholar
Websites of companies Company histories
Industry association websites News releases and information published by industry associations (e.g. Consobiomed, Distretto Biomedicale
Mirandolese)
Industry reports Sectoral studies promoted by chamber of commerce and industry associations
Books Biographies of key players and contributions in edited volumes searched through Google books
Audio video files Transcripts of interviews of key founders available online (Mario Veronesi and some of his early collaborators)
Fig. 1. Chronological display: key events in the first 30 years of Mirandola's biomedical industry development.
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4.1. Phase 1: Genesis
In the late 1950s the American multinational Pfizer hired Mario
Veronesi on commission to provide information about its pharmaceu-
ticals to hospitals in the Veneto and Emilia Romagna regions, while he
was operating one of Mirandola's two licensed pharmacies. This ex-
perience exposed him to the daily problems of hospital staff, including
not only costly medical devices but more importantly the market's
failure to provide them with simple and practical medical devices for
their work. For example, the common practice then in Italy and indeed
nearly everywhere else of reusing rubber tubing and other medical
devices required that they be sterilized. But this procedure posed a
constant risk of infection not to mention the time and cost involved.
Single-use disposable drip lines and blood-transfusion kits to avoid
contamination were mostly unavailable if not actually unheard of.
Veronesi explained how he happened upon the idea of making dis-
posable, plastic, intravenous-gravity-drip lines:
“It all started by pure chance. A boyhood friend of mine, Agide
Campana, who was a chemist and who often came to visit the
pharmacy, was collecting plastic tubes for intravenous drip systems
(iv). At that time the tubes were sterilized and then reused multiple
times, often with harmful effects. I had experienced first-hand their
limits and use in hospitals during my years as a pharmaceutical's
information officer in 1958. I figured the introduction of disposable
plastic tubes could dramatically reduce those problems. My three
years (1955–1958) as a salesman in many hospitals taught me how
the hospital-supply system works, but more crucially how doctors
think. These experiences profoundly affected my professional path,
and it was this line of thinking that eventually brought me to the
decision to found Miraset (Veronesi's first firm) in 1962″ (Veronesi,
“La Plastica della Vita”, p. 5)
Starting out with two partners - both boyhood friends from
Mirandola - one was a certified public accountant and the other pro-
duced saline solutions in Florence - Veronesi quickly moved from as-
sembling a few kinds of plastic-medical devices for hospitals using
purchased components to manufacturing many kinds. Expanding his
competencies and his labor force, his firm grew from three to twenty-
three workers in just eight months, while it was still based in his par-
ents’ home. Working from this rent-free location and near to family,
friends and acquaintances, many of whom helped advance his business
goals, Veronesi never invested in studies to find the most efficient and
competitive manufacturing site. Even had he done so, a cost-benefit
analysis could never have predicted the importance of Mirandola to
both Veronesi and to his first hires, most of whom would continue
working with him for decades. For them Mirandola was not just their
birthplace and home, but an essential element of a shared culture,
community and history. Putnam (1993) and others have detailed the
strong cultural, linguistic (the local Mirandola dialect is still widely
spoken) and familial attachments that have characterized daily pro-
vincial life in Italy's central and north-central regions at least up until
the beginning of the twenty-first century (Pitkin, 1988).
Lack of skilled jobs in Mirandola had forced many vocational school
and university graduates to flee Mirandola to Milan, Turin and even
further destinations, despite their desire to stay put. Veronesi counter-
intuitively turned Mirandola's economic isolation to his advantage,
enticing young scientific and technical people forced to seek work and
learn skills in northern Italy's industrial cities or even abroad back to
Mirandola. Thus from scratch he formed the town's first skilled-labor
market. In the beginning nearly all of his recruits were suggested by
friends and relatives or their acquaintances, reflecting the multiple
nodes of Veronesi's rich and dense social network (Greenwood, 2008).
They saw Veronesi performing a social role of strengthening the com-
munity by bringing their children not only back home, but giving them
a good job in Mirandola's first industrial initiative. So, with no in-
dustrial workforce to speak of and facing severe transport, housing,
cultural and geographical constraints that had narrowed the effective
labor catchment, Veronesi redefined the parameters of the local-labor
market then prevalently defined by agriculture and a thriving knitwear
industry (Lazerson, 1990). Paying above the prevailing area wage, he
also turned to unskilled female labor, initially employed mostly to cut,
solder and assemble plastic tubing.
Understandably, when Veronesi's inexperienced team initially set up
shop to make disposable, plastic-medical kits, and even more so when
making kidney-dialysis machines it was hit and miss. But at the same
time, familiarity with Mirandola's agriculture reaped unexpected divi-
dends for bricoleurs. Informed that the medical kits would need to be
sterilized, they soon realized that ethylene-oxide gas, cheap and widely
used in the area's ubiquitous pear orchards to sterilize fruit would do
the trick. But while pears could be sprayed, medical instruments needed
to be sterilized inside a pressurized, sealed container called an auto-
clave, which they did not have. But then someone recalled that to
process mortadella, a variety of pork sausage and a local culinary de-
licacy, required an autoclave. They then found a local butcher shop to
loan them one, and after converting it their problem was solved.5
Sensitive to his organization's liabilities, Veronesi redeployed his
recruits possessing generic skills to job positions requiring specific
abilities. And in our interviews those who had some experience in
chemistry, hydrodynamics, electronics and engineering design con-
ceded that initially they knew nothing about hemodialysis or even
medical plastics. So it involved translating and analogizing the skills of
his work force to different skills relevant to manufacturing medical
devices. Table B1 in Appendix B illustrates the ancestral team that
formed around Veronesi.
For instance, the chemist Leonardo Bigi, one of the earliest recruits
with a university degree, first worked in a northern petrochemical plant
where he learnt about fluids; but paint fluids coursing through hy-
draulic systems, not extracorporeal blood flowing through plastic
tubing:
Veronesi had known me since I was a kid because he was a phar-
macist, and I ended up almost every day in his shop to fuel my
passion for chemistry, looking for compositions and substances to
run my home experiments. So when Veronesi set up Miraset
(i.e.Veronesi's first company) he just asked me to create the chem-
istry-biology lab to ensure quality control of the company's line of
products. […] There was a guy whose name was Brembilla. He
produced plastics and was a personal friend of Veronesi. So this guy
made plastic prototypes, sent them to me and I ran the analyses and
controls until we ended up developing medical-grade PVC for-
mulations […] the challenge back then was to get non-toxic plastic
material […] Since I was an industrial chemist I was somewhat fa-
miliar with the characteristics of plastic materials and I also really
liked medicine […] so I had a clear sense of how to formulate
medical grade PVC (Leonardo Bigi, personal interview).
Veronesi recast a local electrician who had been installing wires in
5 It should be noted that Veronesi's talent in reworking tools, inventions, and
technologies developed by others benefited significantly from some critical
advances in plastic technology that occurred in the two decades before his
entrepreneurial entry. For example, without the discovery of polyvinyl chloride
(PVC) prior to World War II and continuous improvements to it afterwards
along with declining manufacturing costs during the 1950s, Veronesi's vision
would have remained unrealized (Mulder and Knot, 2001). Similarly, the re-
volution in applying plastics to medical needs for extracorporeal liquids began
not in Mirandola but rather in Rochester, Minnesota at the Mayo Clinic in 1950
when a doctor there managed to fit a plastic catheter to a needle permitting
venipuncture that allowed the blood to flow smoothly through the tub into an
external vessel (Rivera et al., 2005). Similarly, only contemporary advances in
extrusion plastics technology and in dies enabled Veronesi to coax craftsmen
that had been making molds for plastic toys to reconsider what they had been
doing and to start making medical instruments.
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private homes and buildings into an electronics technician charged with
installing and devising the first dialyzers' electrical systems. Then there
was the young telecommunications technician Giancarlo Malavasi, son
of a local policeman whose father wanted him back home from Milan
where he was making antennas and professional radio transmitters.
Veronesi pushed Malavasi to reconfigure his knowledge and apply it to
kidney dialysis:
“Veronesi came to Milan to visit me together with his business
partner, Carlo Gasparini. He knew me through my father who was
Mirandola's traffic policeman! So he learned that I had earned a
technical diploma and was working for this company. Of course I
had no experience whatsoever in medical devices however […] I
had electronics know-how which could be used, especially because I
had been studying thermionic valves […] that is why my very first
job at Miraset-Sterilplast was to develop a conductor to measure the
osmolality of a solution for dialysis, that is the liquid to be used for
extracting impurities from blood through an osmotic principle
(Giancarlo Malavasi, personal interview).
The scientific laboratory process that marked the firm's early days
invariably meant long and uncertain hours. One interviewee captured
the atmosphere of those frenetic days when asked about his schedule.
Laughingly he replied, “there wasn't one”. Fortunately, like university
doctoral students these mostly young technicians without their own
families still lived with their parents and could work late into the night
puzzling out solutions to that day's design and production challenges.
This laboratory atmosphere was reinforced when Veronesi brought in
the principal of the town's only technical high school who moonlighted
training new employees. Veronesi drafted twenty-one-year-old Gianni
Bellini, another Mirandola native and family acquaintance, to establish
a sales and marketing department. A year earlier Veronesi presciently
sent Bellini north to Como to work in a large firm that supplied baby
toys and accessories to nearly every Italian drugstore. There Bellini, a
university dropout but knowledgeable in French and English, appren-
ticed at learning how to compile and assemble frugally and rapidly
merchandise catalogs; a skill soon applied to publicizing Veronesi's
medical devices.
I was very good in languages, which is the principal reason Veronesi
hired me. Our first collaboration started when he had to travel
abroad and needed someone who could speak English at that time,
when it was not so common […] I was born in Mirandola and most
of the people enrolled were from Mirandola (Gianni Bellini, personal
interview).
When challenged to climb the really steep learning curve to master
manufacturing kidney-dialysis machines, Veronesi and his motley team
had the backing of a community of volunteer university scientists and
teaching physicians in addition to some paid external consultants. Most
of these Veronesi had met directly or indirectly from working for Pfizer
in hospitals or from his early reputation manufacturing plastic-medical
devices. The chief pharmacist of the University of Padova, who first met
Veronesi in connection with an order to make specialized, plastic-
tubing devices for dialysis patients, introduced him to Professor Pietro
Confortini, an eminent nephrologist who eventually would found
Europe's largest hemodialysis center at the University of Verona.
Hoping that Veronesi would become an avatar of Italian leadership in
medical devices, Confortini lent Veronesi from his clinic a copy of the
patent-free Kiil dialysis machine (Kiil, 1960), handmade by doctors in
Seattle. This allowed his team to dismantle and copy it over a long
weekend (Grabher, 1993). Confortini hoped to extend the brief lives of
his chronic renal patients by getting Veronesi to manufacture large
numbers of the Kiil dialyzer at reasonable prices.6 When Veronesi
succeeded in doing so in 1965, Confortini's Verona nephrology clinic
soon became a showroom for his dialyzers, frequented by doctors and
public health administrators from Italy and abroad to observe patients
undergoing treatment (Goldoni, 2019). In the absence of official testing
of medical devices, Confortini and other nephrologists filled a reg-
ulatory vacuum by using their own hospital wards and clinics to test the
devices. At the same time, they provided Veronesi with free publicity
and sterling references at international medical conferences.
After Confortini commissioned the first dialysis machine we re-
mained in constant contact with hospital technicians, nephrologists
and physicians…they gave us feedbacks and basically ran the clin-
ical trials of the machines we were developing […] they were our
field consultants […] Back then only Minneapolis was active in this
field; in Europe there was almost nothing. Miraset-Sterilplast pio-
neered the business in Europe with its biomedical products […]
there were no manuals we could follow nor industry experts with
whom we could consult. Our approach was ‘do it yourself!’
(Giancarlo Malavasi, personal interview).
Inevitably, some of the first dialysis machines leaked fluid; on rare
occasions some even caused harm. But without a regulatory framework
or a powerful, tort-liability, legal community, Veronesi could go about
incrementally improving them (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003). What-
ever their defects the machines offered the only near certain alternative
to quick death from uremia. Filling a glaring medical void, Veronesi's
dialyzers quickly occupied an exalted position among the world's
medical-device producers (Agarwal, 2017) (see Appendix F, Figs. F1
and F2, for pictures of the first biochemical lab in Mirandola's history in
Sterilplast in 1962 and Italy's first kidney dialyzer, produced by DASCO
in 1965)
Much as the region's limited economic opportunities paradoxically
aided Veronesi as he proceeded to create a market for skilled labor,
similar factors helped cultivate a market for components and supplies.
Leery but hungry contractors in the surrounding depressed area risked
relatively little joining Veronesi's unproven venture, even if it required
constant learning by doing and improvisation and accepting un-
certainty about payments, investments, planning and outcomes. Those
that signed up were real bricoleurs: collaborators willing to applying
their knowledge and skills to whatever was at hand, open to executing
conceptually similar but unfamiliar new tasks. As Gianni Bellini told us:
We purchased the small plastic tubes from a guy named Brambilla
while the connectors were manufactured by Comef, not far from
here, which at the time produced plastic flowers. After just a few
months we became their lead client.
Before Veronesi had approached them, one firm made plastic-in-
jection molds for imitation flowers while the other made plastic
window blinds and had once worked as a subcontractor for a foreign
medical device firm. Learning to adapt their knowledge to medical-
grade plastics took time, money and effort. But Veronesi's cajoling and
the promise of a share in a new world of medical technology convinced
them. Both of these two firms experienced explosive growth and
eventually became major suppliers to Mirandola's medical-device in-
dustry.
4.2. Phase 2: Expansion
Scholars of organization and management have come to recognize
history's contribution to theory (Lippmann and Aldrich, 2016;
Rowlinson et al., 2014). Consistent with this approach, generational
concepts inject historical lineage into entrepreneurship studies. In
Veronesi's entrepreneurial endeavors, we observed how he had selected
the right person for each job, transmitting to each a kind of en-
trepreneurial blueprint handed down through generations. As an an-
cestral founder, Veronesi stamped his entrepreneurial know-how and
ideas onto the organizational members with whom he interacted,
6 Fred Kiil was a Norwegian urologist who developed the flat plate dialyzer
named after himself.
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setting off ripple effects across the industry. In particular Veronesi's
methods helped inspire his partners and collaborators either to create
new independent companies in the image of his companies or to be-
come high-ranking executives of his former enterprises following their
acquisition by multinationals. Benefiting from fifty years of history, we
can count those recruits who helped shape Mirandola's medical-device
cluster: The genealogical branching of Veronesi's early initiatives
mapped in Fig. 2 indicates his impact across Mirandola's local system.
This chart maps the companies and spinoffs traceable to Mario
Veronesi and his early lieutenants, compressing the information con-
veyed by genealogical trees (Dietrich and Gibson, 1990; Garnsey and
Heffernan, 2005; Mayer and Armstrong, 2011). A genealogy constitutes
the degree of association and proximity of relationships over time,
characterized by affinity ties among firms along a lineage system
(Ellis et al., 2017 Van de Ven and Grazman, 1999). In the stylized figure
vertical lineages indicate companies traceable to the same ancestral
founder. In particular the central lineage traces the companies founded
by Veronesi and his collaborators (Chiles, 2004; Gompers, 2005). The
vertical lineage to the right traces the companies founded by Gianni
Bellini, Veronesi's first right-hand man who also became a serial en-
trepreneur (Cattani, 2017; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Whenever an
organization member exited to create a company a new branch in the
genealogy emerges. Table B2 in Appendix B summarizes the same in-
formation with added details about the career path of each of Veronesi's
early collaborators. As shown, many of Veronesi's early employees
eventually filled entrepreneurial positions, either forming new compa-
nies with Veronesi or striking out on their own.
The economic significance of the branching process stems from the
transfer and exchange of knowledge among founders of new firms and
former employers. Veronesi devised and enacted various rules of thumb
in subsequent companies to capture and exploit opportunities. For in-
stance, core to his entrepreneurial approach was delegating key re-
sponsibilities to his lieutenants early on and then prodding them to
follow in his footsteps:
I encouraged my closest collaborators to take responsibility and
become partners in the entrepreneurial endeavours I envisioned.
Many of my collaborators started as employees and then joined me
as co-founders in my subsequent ventures or started their own
ventures. I think my approach has always been to try and create not
only new companies but perhaps more importantly new prospective
entrepreneurs […] Surprisingly, I did this with them and they seem
to have replicated the same approach with their employees!
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977)
Evidence revealing the perpetuation of this founding pattern re-
appears in subsequent start-ups. When Gianni Bellini founded Miramed
he copied what Veronesi had taught him, immediately giving shares to
three former colleagues at Bellco. After establishing Miramed Bellini
then founded Diatekno. There too he gave shares to two former
Miramed employees. In 1990 Giorgio Mari, the Miramed chemist,
joined with three former colleagues and carved out Biofil from
Miramed, which would eventually be acquired by the German multi-
national Fresenius. Franco Poletti, once a Veronesi employee at Dideco
(interviewed while VP Global Sales at the UK’ multinational LivaNova),
underscored this dynamic:
The Veronesi entrepreneurial model revolved around two key
principles that in many circumstances he reaffirmed: the “clinician's
cult” and the empowerment of collaborators […] for the fortunes of
the companies had to be tied to the fortunes of his lieutenants […]
these same mechanisms […] have served me well over the years.
Veronesi repeated such “simple heuristics” (Manimala, 1992;
Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011) as a mantra to
his employees. Today they have become so much a part of the industry's
vernacular that their authorship is no longer even accredited. This
linguistic evolution suggests how the founder's legacy transcends gen-
erations and recalls the process of second-hand imprinting: “A process
whereby an actor takes on aspects of an imprint borne by another actor”
Fig. 2. The generative impact of Mario Veronesi's companies: serial firm founding and spinoffs.
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(Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013, p. 226).
During our data collection informants who had worked in compa-
nies founded by Veronesi would regularly and spontaneously refer to
one or more of his heuristics. They talked about how his rules in ev-
eryday practice were assimilated and reenacted, rules of thumb that
sustained and guided their own entrepreneurial efforts. Included here
are even individuals who had joined a Veronesi company after the
founder had already moved on. For instance, from the beginning
Veronesi assiduously cultivated strong ties with medical personnel to
advance translational processes to identify new medical device oppor-
tunities “for a bedside-to-bench-to-bedside program” (Bornstein and
Licinio, 2011, p. 1569). This approach has now been widely adopted to
lower research and development costs and speed time to market of new
medical devices. This quote from a sales director of Dideco-Sorin, who
had started working there before Veronesi sold it, captures the lessons
learned:
I soaked up what Veronesi repeated again and again: The doctors
tell you what is needed; and as the doctors’ tailors we can only grow
[…] by making custom-made clothes for them.
Stefano Rimondi, a longtime Bellco CEO and today a cofounder of
Aferetica, said something similar when asked about finding en-
trepreneurial opportunities:
Good ideas are rare and do not arise in a vacuum. You need to visit
hospitals, and talk to technicians and doctors just as Veronesi did.
Veronesi firmly held that only the scale and scope of multinational
corporations could assure the long-term survival not only of his start-
ups but all those belonging to Mirandola's medical-device cluster7
(Agarwal, 2017; Baron, 1999; Biggiero, 2002). Accordingly, grooming
start-up firms to rapidly expand to then become targets for multi-
nationals was a rule of thumb:
I always told my collaborators that you must be ready to let go and
start anew. I was keen on selling my companies to larger corpora-
tions and then starting new businesses […] many of my collabora-
tors turned entrepreneurs have followed the same approach that I
have been taking throughout my career (Mario Veronesi, personal
interview).
Most of the companies founded by Veronesi's disciples followed this
rule. For instance, one who followed in his tracks was Pietro Vescovini,
a skilled machinist, a former employee and subcontractor. He sold his
firm Eurosets, which made oxygenators, in 1991, which later became
completely absorbed by the vertically-integrated, private, Italian hos-
pital and medical-supply firm GVM. Bellini, Veronesi's first protégée,
sold two of his medical-device firms to foreign multinationals: one
purchased by the American, medical-device giant Baxter and the other
by the privately held German B.Braun-Carex. RanD, Bellini's current
company dedicated to artificial-liver technology, once was partly held
by Medtronic (Cattani, 2017; Giuliani, 2011). Meanwhile some of
Belllini's former employees from Miramed, who ended up with its
research and development division after the rest was sold to Baxter,
sold out to the German Fresenius, today the world's largest dialysis
manufacturer and service provider. Other former Bellini employees
turned entrepreneurs include Graziano Azzolini, who sold his start-up
Sidam to the Italian conglomerate Synopo in 2015 (Giuliani, 2011) and
Franco Menarini who sold PEC to the Danish multinational Codan in
2006 (Consoli and Mina, 2009).
Another rule of thumb was “sell but retain control”. It meant
holding on to promising but neglected technologies, which could be a
springboard for founding new medical-device firms. A Veronesi in-
timate explained it best:
“Veronesi had a simple rule he used to repeat to his collaborators:
‘the fastest way to start a company is to rely on the know-how
forgotten or just abandoned by another company’. So […] the
(second) company started-off very simply by marketing products we
had ‘imported’ from Veronesi's prior company. These products were
of no interest to the parent company who had deleted them from
their catalog. The approach was straightforward: start quickly, re-
tain key people and bypass intellectual property issues by leveraging
forgotten technologies! (Alessandro Calari, personal interview)
Leonardo Bigi, the chemist, further illustrated the same point re-
counting the creation of Veronesi's third and fourth company:
Right after selling Dasco we were working on a new type of dialyzer
but the people at Sandoz (the Swiss acquirer of Dasco) told us they
were not interested; what they had worked just fine. So we decided
we would develop it ourselves. Exactly the same thing happened in
cardiac surgery. We had been tinkering with a new oxygenator but
Bellco was not interested. So we said ‘we are going to do it;’ and they
replied that we were free to do it and that it was our business
(Leonardo Bigi, personal interview).
Several of Veronesi's early collaborators provided further evidence
pointing to his heuristics' influence upon their subsequent start-ups.
Alberto Cavicchioli worked with Veronesi in the 1970s, forming Biofil
along with Giorgio Mari to improve and market apheresis (a technology
to separate blood into its component parts), something that Baxter had
jettisoned. When Gianni Bellini quit Bellco to create Miramed he kept
designs for pericranial infusion sets that his former employer had dis-
carded. Mario Atti, an industry veteran, highlighted how this approach
persisted even after the passing of the first generation:
Although I was never part of the Veronesi team […] I followed in his
(Veronesi's) steps when I founded Aferetica. With my co-founder, I
identified an unexploited opportunity in our prior business and we
ran with it to create our company (personal interview).
Opportunistic outsourcing was another rule of Veronesi.
Outsourcing in Italy usually cuts labor costs and taxes, affords greater
economies of scale and intensifies the division of labor, all while
speeding and expanding interfirm-knowledge transfers
(Lazerson, 1988). Veronesi internalized this practice - e.g. outsourcing
plastic tube manufacturing, complementary services, prototype sup-
port, etc. – early on to minimize investments and reduce complexity.
The transmission of these simple rules from the ancestral founder to
subsequent entrants underpinned the early development and growth of
the industry, providing a set of succinct, straightforward, hard-and-fast
entrepreneurial principles that provided direction but without strict
confines (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008; Pieper et al., 2015). In sum-
mary, Veronesi's entrepreneurial successes and ideas stimulated a
number of his early collaborators to strike out on their own. Their firms
would extend the trajectory of Veronesi's model, characterized by si-
milar processes, practices and relationships with suppliers, customers,
and collaborators.
7 This conviction was bolstered by multiple factors (a) the increasing reali-
zation that entering the most lucrative international markets, especially the US
one, meant facing daunting regulatory challenges, requiring depth and breadth
of complementary resources that were well beyond the capacities of small new
entrants (b) the limited structural availability of investment capital and man-
agerial capabilities which could support medical device firms aiming for global
reach (c) his personal aversion to the kind of complex and tiered organizational
structures needed to scale companies globally (d) Veronesi also referred to
Italian cultural attributes of individualism and familism, which
Fukuyama (1995) and others have extensively discussed, as reasons for the
dearth of Italian global companies. As he colorfully explained to us: “Italy has
few multinationals because we are soloists; we like to perform alone. Just look
to the world of music; we have some of the world's greatest violinists and
pianists, but not orchestras”
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4.3. Phase 3: Attraction
As noted earlier, four years after Veronesi initiated production of
Italy's first kidney-dialysis machines in 1965, Sandoz acquired Dasco,
wanting a bolt-on medical-device company for their international
pharmaceutical business (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003; Chiles, 2004;
Golden, 1992; Goldoni, 2019). Sandoz's acquisition became a beacon to
other multinationals, customers and entrepreneurs, alerting them of the
existence of a new medical-device center. Since then Mirandola has
continued to attract attention from new firms, producing a dynamic
medical-device market. According to one informant charged with
Sandoz's acquisitions of Dasco:
We bought Dasco because we saw a great product portfolio.
Veronesi had been developing an array of innovative products in-
cluding the DIALIX, a breakthrough artificial kidney.
Although Dasco was already Veronesi's third firm, the sale to Sandoz
put him on a path to become not only a Schumpeterian entrepreneur
but a serial entrepreneur (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003; Bell and Pavitt,
1993). Each of the subsequent companies he launched also eventually
become multinational subsidiaries (see Table 2). According to Bellini:
Sandoz's acquisition of Dasco was the watershed event. After that, in
the late seventies and onwards the multinationals started to make
massive acquisitions here. We were pioneers in kidney dialysis, and
they wanted fast entry into the marketplace.
In 1972, Veronesi staffed Bellco, his new start-up, almost entirely
with former Dasco employees. Some he rewarded with both shares as
well as high executive positions (see Appendix F, Fig. F3, for a picture
of the founding team). Bellco soon developed the Unimat BL760, a
qualitatively different and advanced dialysis machine with completlely
disposable plastic tubing that could be completely personalized to the
needs of a single patient. Conceived and executed in large measure by
Alessandro Calari, a brilliant technician brought in from Bologna, it also
showed the advantages of bringing in outsiders to an otherwise pure-
bred Mirandola team. Calari's Unimat overnight rendered Sandoz-
DASCO's rudimentary ones essentially worthless. But despite Bellco's
technical achievements, it too would soon end up like Dasco. In 1976
Veronesi sold a majority of his shares to Snia Viscosa - a unit of the
Italian state-owned EniChem that was later sold off to FIAT (Golden,
1992; Gompers, 2005) - that was shopping for medical-device firms. A
former EniChem product manager explained:
At some point it became clear that something special was happening
in Mirandola….Bellco was pioneering dialysis technology…espe-
cially they were spearheading solutions in low invasiveness re-
circulated dialysis….and we wanted to tap into this know-how.
Following the playbook used at Dasco, part of Veronesi's team was
busily founding Dideco, a few kilometers up the road past Mirandola's
historic center, while Veronesi was still managing Snia Viscosa's new
Bellco subsidiary. Dideco was to provide services as well as research
and development for Snia Viscosa, whose state managers possessed
neither the ability nor the interest in creating new products. So in 1978
when Veronesi's contract as interim managing director ended, he sold
his remaining shares to Snia Viscosa and joined his partners at Dideco,
already busy manufacturing oxygenizers based on an unwanted Bellco
patent voluntarily surrendered to Veronesi. An oxygenator is an ex-
tracorporeal-disposable plastic device that replaces carbon dioxide with
oxygen in the patient's blood during cardio-surgery. As with the Kiil
dialysis machine, Veronesi's technicians had re-engineered a Colorado
company's stainless steel oxygenator into an improved disposable
plastic one (Bermiss, 2017).
As Dideco's oxygenators sales soared the American pharmaceutical
company Pfizer seeking to expand their medical device offerings placed
Dideco on its shopping list. And in 1986 Veronesi sold it to them. But
mounting legal expenses and organizational headaches arising from
deaths caused by defective heart-valve implants manufactured at its
Shiley California subsidiary, so frightened Pfizer that it jettisoned their
entire medical-devices portfolio. In 1992 Sorin, an Italian multinational
that was then part of the Snia Viscosa FIAT conglomerate that had
earlier swallowed Bellco, snapped up Dideco from Pfizer along with its
Shiley heart-valve subsidiary, which fit nicely with its own Italian
heart-valve operations. Dideco's original oxygenator still generates
most of Sorin's profits despite multiple changes in ownership and or-
ganization, (Baker, 2007; Baker and Nelson, 2005; Bornstein and
Licinio, 2011). In addition to dialysis and cardiac-care products Ver-
onesi's team achieved breakthroughs in manufacturing other extra-
corporeal medical devices (see Appendix C).
First at Bellco and then later at Dideco, they also developed ma-
chines for apheresis, another extracorporeal process using centrifuges
to separate blood into its component elements: plasma, leukocytes and
erythrocytes. Parallel in time, Haemonetics, a Massachusetts company,
was doing similar work that put technicians from both companies in
regular contact. But while Haemonetics’ apheresis technology even-
tually became a multibillion-dollar business, Dideco's new Sorin owners
abandoned it. And in contrast to their dogged pursuit of promising
technologies ignored by multinationals, Veronesi and his collaborators
this time moved on without it. But while still at the helm of Dideco
Veronesi and his team gained first-place in Europe and second place in
the world for sales of oxygenators used in pediatric-cardiac surgery.
No sooner had Veronesi sold Dideco in 1986 to Pfizer he became
CEO at Dar, where his team were already manufacturing plastic re-
spirator masks. Acquired first in 1993 by the American multinational
Mallinckrodt (Buenstorf and Fornahl, 2009; Denis, 1996), after a series
of corporate restructurings it became Covidien before Medtronic ac-
quired it in 2014. It still manufactures in Mirandola (Consoli et al.,
2016). Shortly before retiring from the industry in 2008, Veronesi to-
gether with his long-time partner Libero Luppi established Starmed a
firm fabricating disposable, plastic ventilation hoods to aid in respira-
tion. The British multinational Intersurgical (Golden, 1992; Hannan and
Freeman, 1986) acquired it shortly thereafter. It too still fabricates
them in Mirandola.
Worthy of mention is that the presence in Mirandola of large foreign
multinationals is most anomalous for Italy, which attracts proportio-
nately less foreign direct investment than any other western European
nation. Today Baxter, Medtronic, Fresenius, B. Braun and Elcam dis-
proportionately account for half or more of Mirandola's medical device
work force and revenues. This too is another anomaly in a country
whose industrial landscape is thick with small- and medium-sized fa-
mily-owned manufacturing firms but few large ones (Italy defines a
firm with more than 500 employees as large.) Allying himself with
international, medical-device giants and surrendering decision-making
and financial control to distant corporate boards, Veronesi very much
rejected the everyday entrepreneurial culture that uncritically accepted
the still rather widespread political and economic Italian industrial
ethos that Italy can prosper without foreign investment and large ver-
tically-integrated corporations, an approach popularized abroad in the
1980s by Piore and Sabel (1984).
Veronesi instead preferred to exchange Mirandola's technology and
knowledge for fast injections of investment capital along with access to
big, new markets. As technological gatekeepers (Giuliani, 2011) mul-
tinationals brought expertise to production processes and logistics as
Table 2
Acquistions of Veronesi’ compnaies by MNCs.
Company Founding year Acquisition year Acquirer
Dasco 1965 1969 Sandoz
Bellco 1973 1976 Enichem
Dideco 1978 1986 Pfizer
Dar 1986 1993 Mallinkrodt
Starmed 1992 2008 Intersurgical
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well as advanced budgetary software, allowing precise and in-
stantaneous feedback about financial costs and revenues
(Biggiero, 2002). All of which were competencies in short supply in
Veronesi's start-ups. The multinationals also contributed to the pro-
fessionalization of the labor market by recruiting Italian managers from
outside the local area (Aldrich (1999); Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Cattani
et al., 2017). Much as Veronesi and his lieutenants bemoaned the de-
mise of the start-ups’ spontaneous, inventive and creative culture fol-
lowing the arrival of the corporate bean counters, they nevertheless
acknowledged that the multinationals’ new organizational methods
gave them the tools to finally learn the exact production costs of each
and every medical device. They also recognized the facility and ex-
pertise with which multinationals satisfied the American FDA's de-
manding regulatory regime, helped by their deep pockets for building
costly clean-rooms and financing exacting testing procedures. On the
other hand, several owners of smaller but still quite successful firms
reported that because financial and organizational limitations impeded
them from meeting FDA testing procedures, they could not export to
America
Recurring community fears that multinational ownership would
lead to corporate off-shoring of jobs to gain competitive advantages
have yet to be proven. Despite the endless game of musical chairs
played by multinationals as they buy and sell firms in Mirandola, so far
only one multinational - Baxter-Travenol - has ever closed its plant and
moved it elsewhere. But even in this case, Bellini's three colleagues
managed to spin off the firm's most valuable activities, eventually
selling them to the German multinational Fresenius. And strengthening
the musical chairs’ metaphor, in 2014 Baxter returned to Mirandola to
buyout the Swedish multinational dialyzer manufacturer Dasco Gambro
(Alvarez et al., 2015; Avnimelech and Feldman, 2010; Baker, 2007;
Clemens and Cook, 1999; Feldman et al., 2019). Mirandola's large
multinational presence has produced a medical-device market that is
complex, articulated and technologically heterogeneous (Buenstorf and
Klepper, 2009; Cameron, 2002; Cooke, 2007; Fligstein, 2001), all in-
dications of dynamism and continuity (Powell and Sandholtz, 2012).
Furthermore not only have many small firms prospered selling services
and niche products, but coinciding with the importance given to
economies of scale a number of specialized firms now manufacture the
customized machines needed to produce vast quantities of medical
devices.
5. A stylized model: the anchor-entrepreneur as industry catalyst
The empirical analysis in this paper shows the dynamic process
through which a pioneering entrepreneur can shape industry formation.
Fig. 3 provides a stylized model of this process that revolves around the
anchor-entrepreneur.
Following Agrawal and Cockburn (2003) and Feldman (2003) we
borrow the anchor concept from the real-estate industry, where it refers
to persuading prestigious putative tenants to rent space in shopping
malls, especially new ones seeking to attract smaller, more specialized
shops (Eppli and Shilling 1995). Following this approach, we suggest
that Mario Veronesi acted as an anchor, engaging with and catalyzing
others to generate collective resources. Others have shown how orga-
nizations influence the processes of value creation. Powell et al. (2012)
refer to “anchor-tenants” as public organizations that foster interactions
among disparate parties and reap community-wide benefits. In ex-
amining organizations that mediate across co-specialized firms,
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) refer to “orchestrators” who nourish the
ecosystem. Similarly, Iansiti and Levien (2004), who drew on bio-
ecology to showcase a specific firm's centrality in advancing the orga-
nizational diversity of a technological community, employed the con-
cept “keystone.” Likewise, anchor-entrepreneurs signal pioneering in-
dividuals who undertake economic activity within a defined area,
triggering widespread social transformation (Alvarez et al., 2015). In
our particular case, evidence points to three generative processes where
anchoring occurs: bricolage, second-hand imprinting and beaconing.
In the early 1960s in Mirandola, Veronesi unconsciously performed
bricolage by unearthing buried resources, exposing unknown cap-
abilities, and unveiling hidden markets. He did what anthropologist
Claude Levi-Strauss (1967) called “making do with what's on hand.”
Extending Levi-Strauss’ concept to value creation, Baker and
Nelson (2005, p. 333) observed that resource-constrained en-
trepreneurs in the Veronesi mold also perform bricolage by “making do
by applying combinations of resources at hand to new problems and
opportunities.” Combinations may be a result of individual
(Baker, 2007) or collective efforts (Garud and Karnoe, 2003). In our
case, Veronesi combined a few resources to unlock new sources of
value. Here, three features of bricolage standout. First, resource scar-
city; in a world of scarcity a constant challenge for entrepreneurs is
making something from nothing. Baker (2007, p. 705) explained:
“Making use of a resource because it is available cheaply or for free,
rather than because it is the right resource, and then combining it with
other resources to take advantage of some new opportunity, exemplifies
bricolage.” Second, Veronesi overcame resource constraints by ignoring
prevailing norms governing their use, opting for “interpretive flex-
ibility” (Star, 2010), which is inherent in local conditions and in objects
where unified meanings do not exist. Here he combined readily avail-
able means to attain novel solutions and spearhead efforts to generate
new resources. Third, by listening attentively to medical professionals
Fig. 3. Anchor-based model of industry catalysis.
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recount daily problems in their practices, he perceived and articulated
needs that markets failed to address (Von Hippel, 1986; Shah and
Tripsas, 2007; Shah and Mody, 2014). These rich information ex-
changes with doctors and nurses about “bed to bench” applications
produced the knowledge to improve dialyzers and other devices.
Toward the end of the sixties after having tinkered with, tested, and
proven his novel entrepreneurial model, Veronesi transmitted his ideas,
practices and entrepreneurial heuristics to his collaborators in a manner
reminiscent of an imprinting process. Organizational imprinting theory
suggests that individual and organizational responses to environmental
conditions persist long after changes in the environment. Recent ela-
borations of the imprinting theory, as previously noted, advance the
possibility of a form of second-hand imprinting; an active social trans-
mission process where organizational members imprint their actions and
ideas on new members (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013; Tilcsik, 2014). Ac-
cording to Simsek et al. (2015) the basis for this idea is that individuals
serve as a “summation and product of their circumstances and, as such,
represent a potential conduit by which the unique circumstances of time
and place are transmitted to the firm”. Consistent with this argument are
findings across a variety of settings that individuals exposed to en-
trepreneurs are more likely to start their own business (Stuart and
Ding, 2006). Moreover, prior workplace experience influences how the
division of labor, the allocation of authority and the design of operational
routines operate in new workplaces (Phillips, 2002; Gompers et al., 2005;
Klepper, 2007; Garnsey et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2019). The organi-
zational genealogy research of Ellis et al. (2017) on the Israeli ICT in-
dustry illustrates this process by demonstrating how workers in firms
established by some ancestral founders not only inherited imprinted
entrepreneurial knowledge from them, but that they themselves became
repositories of knowledge for their own progeny. Ferriani et al. (2012) as
well as Feldman et al. (2019) have also provided evidence of inter-
generational transmission in the internal selection processes of new
ventures that regulate the use and deployment of inherited knowledge.
Similarly, Snihur and Zott (2020) document imprinting processes where
the cognitive orientation, thinking and entrepreneurial aspirations of key
members become embedded in the cognition of other members. In a si-
milar vein Jaskiewicz et al. (2015) advance a theory of transgenerational
imprinting where the entrepreneurial spirit of incumbent generations
may imprint the next generation, extending their entrepreneurial pro-
clivities to future entrepreneurial behavior. These accounts coincide with
the entrepreneurial imprints traceable to Veronesi: simple, succinct,
straightforward, hard-and-fast entrepreneurial heuristics (Shah and Op-
penheimer, 2008) perpetuated across organizations (Pieper et al., 2015).
Indeed, a genealogical lens reveals that Veronesi's former employees who
relied on his heuristic repertoires founded nearly all of the companies
during the industry's early period. Meanwhile traces of those imprints
remain visible and vivid up until these days.
Thus, by the end of the 1970s not only Veronesi's first company
served as a billboard for his generative signs. Former employees who
metamorphized into entrepreneurs modeling their own ventures pur-
suant to their inheritance also did. The reiteration of these same en-
trepreneurial notes and chords was recognized in far off places, at-
tracting resources and capabilities to Mirandola from outside the
region. The outcomes, actions and events triggered by the anchor
showcased the industry. Drawing on signaling research, Bermiss et al.,
2017 suggest that the unique actions, characteristics and social saliency
of organizations can shape large-scale entrepreneurial processes, attract
resources and open a path for new entrants within an industry. Defining
these singular organizations as beacons underscores how they signal to
other players a domain's attractiveness and the potential benefits of
both founding and supporting organizations within that domain. Al-
though the performance of beacons is contextually novel and unique,
they illuminate concrete and easy to process information, which fosters
firms and collective growth through attraction (Bermiss et al., 2017). In
conclusion, anchor-entrepreneurs “turn on” a beacon that triggers at-
tractive light and accelerates entrepreneurial waves of activity.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Challenging past research that emphasizes the planned and pro-
grammed nature of industry emergence, our study reveals that many
generative events are actually random steps taken by pioneering actors
immersed in bricolage. Should their initial efforts succeed , they will be
anchors for the less bold, the less adventurous, the timid; those sitting
in wait to unleash their animal spirits. Next we discuss how our study
contributes to the literature on industry emergence and entrepreneur-
ship. We conclude by delineating policy implications and avenues for
future research.
6.1. Research on industry emergence
Our paper offers insights into early stage industry evolution and
sheds some light “about the sources of industry knowledge for entrants
whose founders have no prior experience in the industry” (Mostafa and
Klepper, 2018, p. 627). Contrary to the prevailing wisdom that novel
industries emerge from the skill sets of those already embedded in si-
milar or parallel industries, this case shows that even those with
minimal or no direct industrial experience can spawn imposing in-
dustrial organizations. Kaplan and Tripsas (2008) propose that these
outcomes may sometimes be traced to the newcomers' freedom from
the baggage of existing conventions. Perhaps Powell and
Sandholtz (2012, p. 384) come closer when they write that the con-
tribution of newcomers is that “their baggage comes from their domain
of origin, not the realm they are entering”. Baggage transferred to a new
domain can contain surprising opportunities for refunctionality and
novelty (Cattani et al., 2017). After all, Veronesi had no technological
nor manufacturing background. Nevertheless, his wholesale pharma-
ceutical and retail-drugstore experience compensated for an otherwise
meager medical-device resume, which rewarded him with a dense
network of patients, pharmaceutical executives and physicians. Not to
mention training him to listen to customers and translating their frus-
trations, problems and needs into tangible products. Veronesi's bri-
colage (Baker and Nelson, 2005) marked by interpretive flexibility and
extensive user-engagement (Von Hippel, 1986) proved central to this
creative process, but two other key generative mechanisms triggered by
Veronesi were second-hand imprinting and beaconing.
We observed that Veronesi and his lieutenants stamped long-term
imprints on Mirandola's medical-device industry that to varying degrees
influence events today (Stinchcombe 1965). His simple rules of starting
new ventures leveraging knowledge assets overlooked by existing
companies; developing ties to medical specialists; encouraging skilled,
entrepreneurial employees to strike out on their own; poaching
founding team members from their organizations; subcontracting
lower-value added activities such as plastic-tube assemblies to mini-
mize costs; and promoting knowledge transfers among firms remain
prevalent in Mirandola today. The routinization of these practices
provided Mirandola with the tools to strengthen its identity and
sharpen its industrial profile. At the same time, by following Veronesi's
approach to expanding economies of scope for plastic disposable pro-
ducts, stimulating contractors, and maintaining close relationships with
physicians as they experimented and tinkered with new ideas, Mir-
andola so far has steered clear of the deadly shoals of inertia that have
sunk many embedded clusters (Grabher, 1993; Ferriani and
MacMillan, 2017). These findings bolster the organizational-imprinting
literature, showing that founders may transmit their entrepreneurial
proclivities as they shape organizations and influence the behavior of
other members through a process of second-hand imprinting
(Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). Imprinting's persistence may not be merely
the outcome of inertia and the environment. It may result from actively
transmitting imprints within and across organizational boundaries
(Johnson, 2007; Pieper et al., 2015; Feldman et al., 2019). On this point
our evidence exposed a variety of recurring heuristics (Bingham and
Eisenhardt, 2011; Bingham and Haleblian, 2012) that guided Veronesi's
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serial entrepreneurial efforts, and which were subsequently perpe-
tuated by his collaborators when they spawned new firms. Despite the
large-scale consequences that second-hand imprinting may unleash, we
should note how little is known about the dynamics and mechanisms
enabling it to transcend generations (Ellis et al., 2017).
Our account of imprinting processes differs from those that em-
phasize the rigidity of social, institutional and cultural structures in
determining developmental trajectories. Instead we bring agency to the
fore. Our research shows how founders and other economic agents are
active participants not passive “conduits through which economic, so-
cial, or cultural forces systematically shape organizational blueprints”
(Baron et al., 1999, p. 542; see also Johnson 2007; Snihur and
Zott, 2020). They constitute the granular elements forming the me-
chanisms of organizational reproduction and inheritance of localized
industry (Klepper, 2007, 2010; Buenstorf and Klepper, 2009;
Ferriani et al., 2012). As pointed out by Marquis and Tilcsik (2013,
p. 232), “recognizing that history matters is of little help unless we
understand how it matters” (but see also Kimberly and
Bouchikhi, 1995; Tilcsik, 2014). A fine grained historical analysis of
pioneering founders and their firms is crucial to record transformative
social and economic change (Drori et al., 2013; Alvarez et al., 2015;
Lippmann and Aldrich, 2016; Aversa et al., 2020).
The anchor-entrepreneur serves as an industry catalyzer by acting as
a beacon for other entrepreneurs (Bermiss et al., 2017). Here “a single
organization [...] attracts widespread attention, resources and signals
the prospects for entrepreneurship” (Bermiss et al., 2017, p. 547) by
exhibiting exceptional and conceivably replicable outcomes. Our data
suggest that Veronesi's new companies and technologies proved potent
attractions for drawing new resources and capabilities to the region.
Once it earned the attention of multinationals, Mirandola's industry
became a virtuous circle as more resources and capabilities flowed in.
Expanded investments increased not only economies of scale but led to
organizational enhancements required to export to the FDA-regulated
American market and to introduce modern fiscal and budgetary mon-
itoring methods (Giuliani, 2011). The expanding market for medical
devices largely underwritten by multinationals also fattened many in-
dependent firms who benefitted from the resulting expansion of the
division of labor and rich knowledge spillovers.8 And contrary to the
expectations of many, the multinational subsidiaries have demonstrated
remarkable economic stability. At least up to now the “specter of de-
capitation” that Cooke (2007, p. 133) prophesized for companies like
them has not materialized.
6.2. Research on institutional entrepreneurship
Our findings resonate with institutional entrepreneurship's under-
standing of entrepreneurs as “active and artful exploiters” (Lawrence and
Suddaby 2006, p. 219) of opportunities. Veronesi appeared cut from this
cloth, endowed with the ability to “induce cooperation in others”
(Fligstein, 2001, p. 105), while opportunistically pursuing a few, well-
defined projects he had stumbled across. Yet appreciating his rapid
success would be hard to do without accounting for the crucial enabling
conditions that enhanced his agency. First, there were the unique reg-
ulatory “testing regimes” (Yaqub, 2017) within which he and his ragtag
band of young technicians maneuvered for many years. What distin-
guishes medical technology from other technologies is that safety con-
siderations remain paramount throughout the production process, since
malfunctioning technologies can be harmful or even deadly. Conse-
quently, deviations from existing traditions of practice are constrained;
testing and redesign cycles are heavily regulated, and as a result vali-
dation processes may be onerous (Yaqub, 2017, 2018; but see also
Consoli and Mina, 2009; Consoli et al., 2016). Today, for instance, reg-
ulatory approval of a high-risk medical device is the endpoint of a
lengthy and uncertain process with costly outlays that may even exceed
$100 million (a large component of which is the cost of clinical research).
These represent tough barriers for pioneer entrants (Stern, 2017). In Italy
however official government regulation and testing of medical devices
dates only from 1990, some twenty-five years after Veronesi had started
producing dialysis machines. And within the European Union it was not
until 1993 when the Council of European Communities issued the
Medical Device Directive introducing the CE Mark to regulate medical
devices in the European economic area. Not even the respected American
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulated the testing and approval
of medical devices and instruments until 1976. This followed some well-
publicized medical device failures, which prodded the U.S. Congress to
pass the Medical Device Amendments Act, establishing the current reg-
ulatory framework. Among our informants there was a consensus that
the early, lax regulatory conditions gave them wide latitude for experi-
menting, innovating, maneuvering, and shaping the institutional en-
vironment to a degree unimaginanable today. This point is underscored
by Cameron's history of modern dialysis: “Dialysis could not be invented
nowadays – or at least clinical dialysis could not be invented – because of
the regulatory regimes now in place” (2002, p. 24).
Italian legislative passage in 1967 (some two years after Veronesi's
entry into hemodialysis) mandating the Ministry of Health (then ad-
ministered by INAM) to reimburse hospitals for kidney dialysis ex-
penses represented another crucial enabling condition. It underpinned
the sudden surge in patients undergoing dialysis. One year later Dasco
already had installed 1000 dialysis units in Italian hospitals, crowning
its success as the leading European artificial kidney manufacturer
(Geatti, 2018, p. 16). Similarly, demand in the U.S. skyrocketed in
1973, following the federal government's extension of Medicare cov-
erage to all dialysis treatments under the End-Stage Renal Disease
(ESRD) program (Peitzman, 2007). Prior to that, the prohibitive costs of
dialysis - about $40,000 annually per patient - led to both strict ra-
tioning and limited availability of dialyzers (McBride, 2009). The jus-
tification for this unprecedented program that extended subsidized
dialysis care to all was that the kidney dialyzer was a proven medical
“miracle” that literally saved lives9 (Kolata, 1980). Because of the ESRD
program, treatment centers expanded exponentially, fueling rapid in-
dustry growth, and accordingly evermore interest in the technologies
being hatched in Veronesi's network of companies.
These observations point to a less actor-centric narrative, one more
sensitive to meso- and macro-level economic, social and political forces.
In this realm the success of entrepreneurial projects depends far less on
an individual's agency. Such a narrative affords reasonable “potential
8 So anxious were the first wave of multinationals to have a piece not only of
Mirandola's technology but of its entrepreneurial spirit and creativity that some
delayed fully integrating their newly acquired subsidiaries into their organi-
zation until after Veronesi and his progeny resigned as managing directors.
Today it is hard to detect a “third-hand imprinting” extending beyond incre-
mental innovations. Nevertheless there are some indications of qualitatively
different medical devices emerging such as those required in the field of mo-
lecular medicine (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011; Bingham and
Haleblian, 2012; Bresnahan et al., 2001; Dietrich and Gibson, 1990; Feldman
and Francis, 2004; Fligstein, 2001; Garnsey et al., 2008). These developments,
which have sometimes arrived in Mirandola from external actors, unconnected
to any multinationals, offer new interesting research avenues. Should they
become more tangible and find support within the existing ecosystem, they will
prove an impetus for research that will both reposition and rejuvenate Mir-
andola.
9 Nephrologists concur in identifying the mid-sixties as the golden age of
dialysis (Trachtman et al., 2014; Geatti, 2018). Before the diffusion of artificial
kidneys and hemodialysis techniques patients affected by kidney failure faced
no other alternative than death: they quickly become uremic, poisoned by the
body's own wastes, and perished after experiencing extremely painful symp-
toms (Holden, 1980). Already in the early seventies, end-stage renal disease
patients undergoing regular dialysis were able to keep up their housework or
hold part-time or full-time jobs (see also “Dialysis or Death”, The New York
Times, March 7, 1976)
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for outcomes which are not necessarily those originally intended by the
actors involved” (Hardy and Maguire, 2008, p. 206, but see also
Storey, 2011). Thus, while incorporating the role of agency, it reduces
risks of swinging too far in that direction, downplaying the particular
context within which humans create new entities and the kinds of
“blundering” that March (1971), Weick, 1979 and Aldrich (1999) have
described. In this way, attributions of causality to one or even a handful
of actors are more likely to be problematized, paying more attention to
the emergent, multifaceted, and distributed nature of the en-
trepreneurial process. Looking for emergent outcomes does not leave
human agency out; far from it. But humans as Aldrich (2010, p. 348)
humorously warns, “resemble King Lear more than they do Rocky
Balboa.”
6.3. Policy implications
Our findings have implications for policy and the debate about the
proper role of the government in promoting entrepreneurship and tar-
geting industries for development. One possible implication is that iden-
tifying, nurturing and developing industrial opportunities may best be left
to entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, pioneering entrepreneurs with char-
acteristics akin to those of Veronesi are too often invisible to planners
intending to foster new industries, too often standing outside the con-
ventional political field of vision. One in which entrepreneurship is un-
derstood as a function of the state directly or indirectly developing the
infrastructure and surrounding economic conditions. Bresnahan et al.
(2001, p.842) capture the essence of this approach. They write that not
only does new industry require first “building the economic fundamentals
for an industry or technology;” but afterward there remains the challenge
of “finding the spark of entrepreneurship to get it going.” We found no
evidence of this in Mirandola. Indeed Mirandola's industrial trajectory
suggests reversing that process: It is individual actors with the capacity to
create, diffuse, and creatively exploit knowledge who lay the foundations
of industry emergence. Policy interventions should be more sensitive to
the early identification of these actors and “their role in making it happen”
(Sarasvathy, 2004: 520). For example, rather than merely focusing on
encouraging startups, policy may need to bet more selectively on experi-
enced entrepreneurs who can catalyze resources and competences by be-
coming involved in creating additional ventures. Overlay mapping tech-
niques as well as other scientometric approaches aimed at the early
detection of weak signals or outliers in technological and categorical space
(Rotolo et al., 2015) could offer policymakers a valuable toolkit. Recent
techniques for identifying nascent seeds of new industries (Ferriani et al.,
2016; Roe and Potts, 2016) could also prove useful in this endeavor.
What policy inputs could the technological trajectory experienced
by Mirandola in the early 1960s offer to today's late industrializing
countries? To address this question, we note that such a trajectory
benefited from the concatenated accumulation of production and
technological capabilities (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). The substantial
overlap of the knowledge base of both facilitated this process. In other
words the knowledge required to produce the first dialysis machines
was not inaccessible to many of the people who used and operated
them. Consequently, the latter process provided a basis for learning
about the former. Indeed in the early days of dialysis medical practi-
tioners like Kiil in Norway, Confortini in Italy, or Scribner in the USA
used any available components to construct rudimentary dialysis
equipment (Blagg, 2007; Cameron, 2002). Sausage casing, industrial
pumps, and other non-medical components were employed to build the
first crude, dialysis prototypes. In sparking the entrepreneurial wave
that seeded the medical-device industry, Veronesi relied extensively on
these prototypes and used them to guide his trial and error efforts
(McBride, 2009). Today's specialization has created too vast a gulf be-
tween the kinds of competencies required to use and create given
technologies for any single actor to be able to cross this chasm (Bell and
Pavitt, 1993). The replication of this path for later entrants seems
therefore unlikely. A modern day alternative to linking technological
capability and accumulation of production capacity could be the crea-
tion of dedicated social foci (Feld, 1981) where individuals from diverse
domains (i.e., nephrologists, urologists, engineers, entrepreneurs, etc.)
can recombine their different templates and practices through situated,
collective microinteractions (Furnari, 2014). Examples of such inter-
active settings from other industries include the motor clubs that fueled
the emergence of British motorsport in the post-World War II period by
bringing together a diverse group of amateur car racers - doctors,
journalists, aerospace engineers, and mechanics (Morgan, 2009;
Aversa et al., 2020). Another more contemporary example is the digital
fabrication labs where computer scientists, architects, and visual artists
intermingle to experiment with and develop new 3D digital technolo-
gies (Walter-Herrmann and Buching, 2013).
Our case also offers interesting insights into the interplay of en-
trepreneurial dynamics and regulatory regimes in shaping industry
formation. In many industries government approval or licensing is a
prerequisite for market entry. Examples include nearly all areas of the
energy, transportation and health-care industries. Yet, as we have al-
ready noted from the early 1960s and for many years afterwards, no
official government regulation and testing of medical devices existed in
most countries. While other studies have illustrated how entrepreneurs
can take advantage of this regulatory void in nascent markets
(Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009), perhaps more interesting here is the role
pioneers play in filling such a void. Indeed in the early days, the Min-
istry of Health regularly invited Veronesi and his collaborators to work
with them to establish the certification standards for the emerging
medical technologies. As Leonardo Bigi - Veronesi's chemist - explained:
About a year of two after I had developed a pvc plastic tube of medical
grade quality that could be used with the dialysis machines, I contacted
the Ministry of Health's Research Institute (Istituto Superiore di Sanità),
requesting to officially register it with the government…They told me,
‘Excellent! Now we can work together to establish the procedures and
rules together.’ So it was very easy, since those rules where modelled
upon the pioneering materials that we made.
What is clear here is that regulatory interventions are a collabora-
tive effort involving the entrepreneur, rather than being imposed in a
top-down manner. Policymakers should be sensitive to the role of early
entrants in contributing to the regulatory framework of emerging in-
dustries when the implications of novel technologies are still poorly
understood and the yardsticks for establishing institutional legitimacy
have yet to be developed. As Smolka and Heugens, 2020 (p. 656) have
noted: “Public pressure on governments to regulate newly emerging
fields is on the increase, urging them to reach out to entrepreneurs to
reduce knowledge gaps and information asymmetries”. New medical
technologies will grow in importance over the coming years, and early
engagement and clear communication between regulators and in-
novators can help shape future policies governing new product devel-
opment and regulation (Kaplan and Stern, 2018).
7. Concluding remarks
Although elements of particularism have long marked Italian eco-
nomic development, it would be mistaken to interpret what has oc-
curred in Mirandola as inapplicable to other countries with different
economic and legal structures. Earlier we offered suggestive evidence of
entrepreneurs spearheading entirely new industries across many dif-
ferent domains (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 2016). Alvarez et al. (2015)
recounted how Lowell Wakefeld began the Alaska king crab industry.
Mostafa and Klepper (2018) have documented the pioneering role of
Daesh Garment to jump-start the Bangladesh garment industry against
unfavorable conditions. Even in the field of medical devices, there is the
American, orthopedic-device industry (Marsh 2012) that owes its ex-
istence in large measure to an American Veronesi. It is still located
today in the vicinity of the small Indiana town of Warsaw where the
industry sprouted in 1895, after the pharmacist-founder and salesman
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Revra DePuy started making his first orthopedic devices. Today the
various merged successor companies are capitalized at billions of dol-
lars on the New York Stock Exchange; an evolutionary example of the
change from extreme structural simplicity to organizational complexity
(Simon, 2009). These examples also resonate with findings on home-
grown entrepreneurs (Feldman and Francis, 2004; Avnimelech and
Feldman, 2010) that served as a model of regional development by
fostering local spinoffs and attracting resources. More comparative re-
search is warranted to advance knowledge of how and under what
conditions ancestral founders anchor new industries. This and related
areas of inquiry could reveal further industry specific anchoring pro-
cesses, yield deeper insights into the social drivers of industry emer-
gence, and enrich our understanding of the micro foundations of in-
dustries’ evolutionary trajectory.
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Appendix A
Table A1.
Table A1
Illustrative qualitative evidence from fieldwork and archives.
Dimension Representative quotes
Bricolage “From a technical standpoint, hemodialysis was not rocket science. I started manufacturing the first devices with my collaborators at Sterilplast, helped
by some good craftsmen from the Mirandola area who knew their stuff. I also received vital help from a science teacher who was the head of
Mirandola's only vocational school. That's how I put together my first product line” (Mario Veronesi, personal interview).
“We purchased the small plastic tubes from a guy named Brambilla. Meanwhile the connectors were manufactured by Comef, located not far from here,
which at the time produced plastic flowers. After just a few months I became their lead client” (Mario Veronesi, [1])
"My job at Sterilplast had basically nothing to do with my prior work….I learned primarily through trial and error and possessed a strong “do it
yourself attitude”. We were in constant contact with hospital personnel, especially the nephrologists who usually ran the clinical trials of the devices
we were co-developing. We were all novices with very limited, if not any medical knowledge and basic technical backgrounds. We processed inputs
and ideas which were coming from the US, and then manufactured our own devices based on experimentation and imitation. Sterilplast was the first
company in Europe to develop these kinds of products following guidelines from Italian nephrologists. But we did not really invent anything from
scratch” (Lucio Gibertoni, personal interview)
“While I was observing some tests on a patient I became convinced that the technology was fairly simple. The Kiil dialysis machine was not patented
and the monitor had been built using a component freely available on the UK market. It was clear to me that in order to build a market for my
disposable circuits, I had to develop a full-fledged all-in-one dialysis device. So I asked Dr. Confortini to lend me the Kiil over the week-end. We worked
around the clock to create a prototype which turned out to be identical to the Kiil. That is when I decided to found DASCO: Divisione Apparecchi
Scientifici” (Mario Veronesi, personal interview)
“The spark was ignited by Dr Confortini. Dr Confortini was in charge of Verona's hemodialysis clinic. One day he said, “Why don't you try this? I think
you can do it”. So we said “Why not? Let us give it a try!”. At that time we were few in number, and so we were more comfortable taking risks. I knew I
could deal with PVC formulations. I had a good understanding of the process. And then there was this guy, Mr Brambilla, who said, “Do not worry I
know how to make a plastic tube; that is my business” (Leonardo Bigi)
“We hardly used any third parties, simply because there just weren't any. Therefore we created the technology inside the firm, mostly playing with
what was at hand” (Gianni Bellini, personal interview)
Second-hand imprinting “I have been always trying to nurture and forge many small entrepreneurs. Over the years they showed me that I succeeded, as many of them did create
their own companies […] I did it with my employees and they will do it with theirs” (Mario Veronesi, [58])
“In 1976 Gianni Bellini is still in Bellco, but his mind is elsewhere, absorbed with the creation of Miramed and the dream of emulating Veronesi by
launching a new company […] The company would produce, at least in the very beginning, products that Veronesi in Bellco had discarded, [because]
feeling they had no market potential: infusion kits, epicranial sets, disposable gloves, etc.” (Goldoni, 2019, p. 24)
“The managers from the multinationals were shocked by the repeated success of a bunch of peasant farmers with limited formal education and very
modest backgrounds. But quite honestly we always followed the same path: we focused on projects or products that had been side-lined or forgotten by
the acquiring multinational for whatever reasons (this was almost invariably the case whenever a new multinational arrived) and then manufactured
them in a new company. […] For example, at the time of founding BELLCO, we found ourselves inheriting several products that DASCO no longer
expressed interest: a disposable roller-type dialysis filter, a hemodialysis device not requiring sterilization of the hydraulic system after each use, a
blood pump that we had been developing with the Belgian nephrologist, Professor Ringoir of Ghent. We also recruited our old collaborators employed
in sales who had been laid off by Enichem […] this approach to building new companies was replicated by many of my former colleagues when they
made the [entrepreneurial] jump” (Giorgio Goldoni, personal interview).
“In the mid-1980s, Baxter acquired Miramed. But given the parent company's lack of interest in the project I had been working on in my free time – a
filter to separate donor blood cells - I left the company along with some former colleagues and we founded Biofil” (Giorgio Mari, [54]).
“When a former employee created a new company for at least 7 to 8 years afterwards there was a visible ‘Veronesi imprint’ permeating the new firm”
(Gianni Bellini, personal interview)
“In my company I behave, often without even realizing it, exactly as Veronesi behaved 30 years ago. Just to give you an example, I encourage rapid
decision-making just as he used to do all the time. He used to call it “the system of super-quick decisions”. If we had 10 problems we gathered in the
(continued on next page)
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Appendix B
Tables B1 and B2.
Table B1
The composition of the ancestral team.
Name Age Competence Background Previous experience Origin
Leonardo Bigi 23 Laboratory specialist BSc, Industrial Chemistry N Mirandola
Gianni Bellini 21 Fluent in English High school diploma N Mirandola
Libero Luppi 27 Mechanical expert Technical school diploma Y (Tire company) Mirandola
Carlo Gasparini 37 Accountant University degree, economics Yes Certified Public Account Mirandola
Carlo Trazzi 20 Accountant Technical school diploma N Mirandola
Giancarlo Malavasi 24 Telecommunication technician Technical school diploma Y (antenna maintenance) Mirandola
Romano Flandoli 33 Mechanical expert Technical school diploma Y (teacher at the local technical school) Mirandola
Giorgio Goldoni 20 Fluent in German University degree, languages N (school teacher) Mirandola
Table B2
The transition to entrepreneurship of Mario Veronesi's early employees.
Name Employee Veronesi's co-founder
(minority stake)
Entrepreneur
Carlo Bellini Miraset/
Sterilplast
Bellco Miramed
Gianni Bellini Miraset/
Sterilplast
Dasco
Bellco Miramed
Diatekno
Carex
Rand
Rigenerand
Alessandro Calari Dasco Dideco
Bellco
/
Massimo Fini Dideco / Cortek
Romano Flandoli Dasco Bellco –
Giorgio Garuti Dasco Bellco /
Carlo Gasaparini Miraset/Sterilplast
Dasco
Bellco
Berco
Lucio Gibertoni Dasco Bellco
Dideco
Dar
Redax
(continued on next page)
Table A1 (continued)
Dimension Representative quotes
evening around the table and we devoted, say, 10 min to address each problem. The following day we implemented what we had decided with no
hesitation. This is key to give impulse and energy to actions, and it has served me well for the past 30 years” (Gianni Bellini, [60])
Beaconing “Sandoz was very interested in acquiring Dasco because of the numerous pioneering solutions that it was churning out. In the end, it was the best choice
for Sandoz and Mirandola. In addition the acquisition led a cadre of experienced international managers to relocate here from Switzerland” (Giorgio
Goldoni, personal interview)
“We bought Dasco because we realized it had a great product portfolio. Veronesi had been developing an array of innovative products including the
DIALIX a breakthrough dialyzer.” (Manager in charge of M&A at Sandoz, personal interview)
“B.Braun Avitum is the only company within the B-Braun galaxy to produce parenteral nutrition bags. It is the center of excellence for dialysis products
because Mirandola developed worldwide leadership in this area” (Distretto Biomedicale di Mirandola: Gli effetti del sisma e della ricostruzione sulle
strategie delle imprese della filiera biomedicale, p. 48).
“Sandoz's acquisition of Dasco - Veronesi's second company - was the watershed event. After that, in the late 1970s and onwards, the multinationals
started to make massive acquisitions here. We were pioneers in kidney dialysis, and they wanted fast entry into the marketplace (Gianni Bellini, personal
interview)
“Right after Gambro's acquisition of Hospal-Dasco from Sandoz we started to search for a partner to challenge its increasing market power for
hemodialysis. We immediately looked at Mirandola because we knew there were unique competences in this domain. We joined forces with Bellco with
the goal of creating an Italian dialysis hub” (Umberto Rosa, AD Sorin Biomedica, Il Sole 24 Ore, 4/3/1988)
“Overall, from the early 1990s and until 2000 Mallinkrodt invested approximately 40 million Euros in Mirandola in addition to the cost of the M&A
transaction. The US multinationals had extremely rigorous accounting practices but gave us considerable free rein on the business-development side”
(Veronesi, La Plastica della vita, pp 151–152)
None of the respondents spoke English as a first language. Some quotes have been edited. A few quotes are from notes taken by one of the co-authors during the
interviews because of technical problems with the tape recorder.
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Appendix C
Table C1.
Appendix D
Table D1.
Table C1
Landmark products developed by Veronesi's companies.
Year Product Company
1965 Dialyzer Kiil Sterilplast/Dasco
1966 DAS 2005 – Monitor to regulate and control dialysis
saline solution
Dasco
1967 First peristaltic pump (DAS 225) Dasco
1969 First artificial kidney Dasco
1973 Single pass kidney dialyzer (UNIMAT) Bellco
1979 Cell separator for hematic components (BT795P) Bellco
1980 First European oxygenator for extracorporeal
circulation (BT 795)
Dideco
1988 First hollow fiber membrane oxygenator (LILLIPUT) Dideco
1992 First oxygenator for neonatal patients Dideco
Table B2 (continued)
Name Employee Veronesi's co-founder
(minority stake)
Entrepreneur
Giorgio Goldoni Mirasetr/
Sterilplast
Dasco
Bellco
Dideco
/ Miramed
Libero Luppi Dasco Bellco
Dideco
Cortek
Starmed
Giancarlo Malavasi Miraset/
Sterilplast
Dasco
Bellco
Haemotronics
Berco
Claudio Trazzi Miraset/
Sterilplast
Dasco
Bellco
Dideco
Dar
/
Pietro Vescovini Dideco Eurosets
Table D1
Interviewees: position and number of interviews.
Informant Role at time of interview Prior relevant roles Interv.
Aldrovandi Mauro Engineer Dasco Gambro Dasco Gambro, past employee; 2
Atti Mauro Aferetica, CEO & Co-founder Bellco, CSO; Gambro/Hospal, Marketing Director 1
Azzolini Libero Dasco Gambro, Prod Head 1
Balbo Enrico Balbo Medical, President Early employee at Gambro Dasco, Bellco, Miramed, Dasco 1
Bellini Gianni RanD, Founder Founder of Miramed, Rigenerand; early employee at Sterilplast, Dasco 6
Boggio Luigi Assobio Association, Pres. 1
Benatti Paolo Sorin Group Italy, VP Miramed, CFO 1
Bigi Leonardo Freelance consultant Early employee at Sterilplast, Bellco, Dideco, Sorin 1
Bisi Giuseppe HMC Premedial, President 1
Calari Alessandro Retired employee at \, Bellco, and executive atDideco 5
Cavaliere Stefano Managing Director, Covidien -Mirandola 1
Cavicchi Antonella Personal assistant to Veronesi Bellco , Didecco and Covidien 2
Cirelli Elio Retired CFO, DascoGambro 1
Cotti Mauro Haemotronics, Co-founder 1
Fecondini, Ing. Group Medica, President President, Biomedical Consortium; started as engineer at Dasco Gambro 1
Eruzzi Silvio Lucomed, Chairman CEO, Haemotronics 1
Fava Vanna Fava Vanna, Founder subcontractor to Dideco and Eurosets, partner of Pietro Vescovini 1
Gavioli Giuliana Tecnopolo Veronesi, CEO B.Braun, Director Quality Ins. &
Reg. Affairs
Started at Biofil. 3
(continued on next page)
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Appendix E
Mirandola-specific archival sources
Press articles
(1) “Mario della Mirandola”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 22 febbraio 1986
(2) “Un caso italiano, nel bene e nel male”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 22/02/1986
(3) “La fabbrica della salute ha un fatturato di 137 miliardi”, La Gazzetta di Modena, 15/10/1986
(4) “Salute, un affarone”, La Gazzetta di Modena, 18/10/1986
(5) “Cuori artificiali targati Fiat”, La Gazzetta di Modena, 04/09/1987
(6) “Alla Volvo la Hospal Dasco”, L'Unità, 29/07/1987
(7) “La Volvo ha fatto un buon affare”, L'Unità, 30/07/1987
(8) “La fabbrica del cuore”, La Gazzetta di Modena, 16/10/1987
(9) “Capitale cardiochirurgica”, La Gazzetta di Modena, 04/01/1988
(10) “Così Mario della Mirandola creò il biomedicale”, L'Unità, 07/12/1988
(11) “C’è anche chi assume”, La Gazzetta di Modena, 17/12/1988
(12) “I prodotti mirandolesi cercano nuovi mercati”, Il Resto del Carlino, 1988
(13) “Il mago del biomedicale”, L'Espresso, 1988
(14) “Così Bellco sta preparando la dialisi intelligente”, Mondo Economico, 1989
(15) “Il biomedicale guarda al futuro”, http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/il-biomedicale-guarda-al-futuro/, 1989
(16) “L'autunno che sconvolgerà Mirandola”, Il Resto del Carlino, 26 Agosto 1990 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/432/)
(17) “Caccia grossa a Dideco”, Il Resto del Carlino, 17 Dicembre 1991 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/caccia-grossa-a-dideco/)
(18) “Check-up all'industria della salute”, Modena Mondo, marzo 1998 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/dffgfdg/)
(19) “La Tyco International acquista la Dar”, Il Resto del Carlino, 4 luglio 2000 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/la-tyco-international-acquista-
la-dar/)
(20) “Biomedical valley' a focal point for health product manufacturing”, The BBI Newsletter; June 1, 2001
(21) “Mirandola: Italy's biomedical valley”, Medical Device Technology, 13(5): 30–32
(22) “La boutique degli organi artificiali”, Il Giornale, 27 marzo 2004 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/la-boutique-degli-organi-artificiali/) +
(23) “Mario Veronesi, l'uomo delle start up dal '66 ne ha fondate e vendute quattro”, Repubblica, 21–7–2008
(24) “Gambro, una scelta prevedibile”, Il Resto del Carlino, 1 febbraio 2011 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/gambro-una-scelta-prevedibile/)
(25) “Da CODAN a Menny Medical, continua l'esperienza nel biomedicale”, La plastica della vita, N. 1 2011 – anno 7° (p. 9)
(26) “Covidien investe a Mirandola”, La plastica della vita, N. 1 2012 – anno 8° (p. 3)
(27) “Nascita e sviluppo del biomedicale mirandolese”, N. 1 2012 – anno 8° (inserto)
(28) “Ri.Mos festeggia la nuova sede”, La plastica della vita, N. 2 2013 – anno 9° (p. 23)
(29) “Il Dottor Mario Veronesi in visita alle aziende del distretto per presentare il portale www.distrettobiomedicale.it”, La plastica della vita, N. 3
2013 – anno 9° (p. 18)
Table D1 (continued)
Informant Role at time of interview Prior relevant roles Interv.
Gibertoni Lucio Redax, Founder Darex, Founder; early employee at Sterilplast, Bellco 2
Goldoni Giorgio Retired Early empl. Sterilpl., Bellco, Dideco 5
Gorni Maria Nora Ri. Mos, Founder 1
Luppi Libero Star Med, Founder Cortec, Found; early employee Sterilpast, Dasco, Bellco, Dideco 1
Malavasi Giancarlo Retired Early employee at Sterilplast, Bellco, Miramed, Fresenius; Founder of Berco, 1
Mari Giorgio Rigenerand, CEO Founder, Biofil; Production Head, Miramed; Managing director, Fresenius 1
Menarini Franco Menny Medical, Founder Early engineering employee at Biofil. Founder of PEC. 2
Mirto Giuseppe and Enrico MIBA, Founders Subcontractors to Veronesi and others. 1
Nicolini Alberto Journalist, CPA and industry consultant Founder of La Plastica della Vita 1
Poggioli Paolo Consobiomed Consortium, Founder Founder, Kidline, Emo, Kilab, Med Italia, Medistar; Early engineering
employee at Hospal-Dasco
1
Parrino Andrea Lean, Founder Started as engineer at Dasco Gambro 2
Raivitz Ehud Elcom, President & CEO Acquired Lucamed on behalf of Israeli Kibbutz Bar'am 1
Rimondi Stefano Afretica, Founder Early employee at Bellco 6
Veronesi Mario Retired Founding father 3
Vescovini Paolo Eurosets, Founder Early employee and machinist at Dideco, partner at Fava Vanna. 1
Zanazi Marco Gambro,Plant Director Engineer 1
TOTAL 61
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(30) “Ivonne Gavioli, il biomedicale raccontato da chi l'ha vissuto negli anni in cui questo settore fioriva ogni giorno”, La plastica della vita, N. 3 2013
– anno 9° (p. 21)
(31) “Via al Campus del Biomedicale”, Prima Pagina, 19 maggio 2013 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/via-al-campus-del-biomedicale-2/)
(32) “Un laboratorio all'avanguardia per formare esperti di biomedicale”, Il Resto del Carlino Modena, 21 maggio 2013 (http://www.biomediland.it/
portfolio/un-laboratorio-allavanguardia-per-formare-esperti-di-biomedicale/)
(33) “Inaugurato il campus del Biomedicale”, Qui Modena, 21 maggio 2013 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/inaugurato-il-campus-del-
biomedicale/)
(34) “Il tecnopolo del biomedicale farà ripartire le nostre scuole”, Gazzetta di Modena, 21 maggio 2013 (http://www.biomediland.it/portfolio/il-
tecnopolo-del-biomedicale-fara-ripartire-le-nostre-scuole/)
(35) Distretto Biomedicale di Mirandola. Gli effetti del sisma e della ricostruzione sulle strategie delle imprese della filiera biomedicale, a cura dell'Assessorato
Attività Produttive della Regione Emilia-Romagna, dicembre 2013
(36) “Obiettivo salute – Ritratti d'impresa: Fresenius Hemocare Italia”, Outlook, luglio-agosto 2014
(37) “Un'impegnativa “timetable” per il nuovo stabilimento Fresenius a Mirandola”, La plastica della vita, N. 1 2015 – anno 11° (p. 26)
(38) “Bior Medica si allarga e scommette sul distretto biomedicale mirandolese”, La plastica della vita, N. 1 2015 – anno 11° (p. 28)
(39) “Innovazione per la vita il tour è partito dalla “nostra” Gambro Baxter”, La plastica della vita, N. 2 2015 – anno 11° (p. 16)
(40) “40 anni nel biomedicale, dove lavoro e passione si intrecciano! Intervista a Luciano Fecondini”, La plastica della vita, N. 3 2015 – anno 11° (p.
11)
(41) “Glomeria annuncia l'ingresso sul mercato della dialisi di nuova generazione supportata da Spindial”, La plastica della vita, N. 3 2015 – anno 11°
(p. 17)
(42) “Open day per festeggiare il nuovo stabilimento Fresenius di Mirandola”, La plastica della vita, N. 3 2015 – anno 11° (p. 24)
(43) “Biomedicale per passione – Ritratti d'impresa: Sorin Group”, Outlook, luglio-agosto 2015
(44) “Il futuro di Bellco con Medtronic parliamone insieme a Luciano Frattini”, N. 1 2016 – anno 12° (p. 7)
(45) “Intervista a Giorgio Mari”, La plastica della vita, N. 1 2016 – anno 12° (p. 10)
(46) “Neuron Guard: 2,5 milini e poi il debutto”, Corriere Imprese, 30 gennaio 2017
Biomedical industry reports
(47) Osservatorio sul settore biomedicale nel distretto mirandolese (prima rilevazione), a cura di Ricerche e Interventi di politica industriale e del lavoro,
1999
(48) Osservatorio sul settore biomedicale nel distretto mirandolese (seconda rilevazione), a cura di Ricerche e Interventi di politica industriale e del
lavoro, 2003
(49) Osservatorio sul settore biomedicale nel distretto mirandolese (terza rilevazione), a cura di Ricerche e Interventi di politica industriale e del lavoro,
2004
Books
(50) Bellini, G. (2009). Presente e futuro dell'economia mirandolese, in Storia e progresso del territorio mirandolese. 50 anni con il “Galilei”
1959–2009, a cura di Fabio Balboni, Ubaldo Chiarotti, Giuseppe Pedrielli, Istituto Galileo Galilei editore, Mirandola.
(51) Goldoni, G. (2015). La storia tragica dell'ascesa e caduta dei presidi chirurgici di Mirandola (https://storiabiomedicale.weebly.com/uploads/1/8/
6/1/18610776/storia_biomedicale_goldoni.pdf), Al Barnardon editore, Mirandola.
(52) Rolando, R. (2003) The Plastic of Life: The History of the Pharmacist from Mirandola who started the Italian Biomedical Industry and created the first
Artificial Kidney Made in Italy, Edizioni Artestampa, Modena.
(53) Mosconi, F., Montella, F. (2018) Dal garage al distretto. Il biomedicale mirandolese. Storia, evoluzione e prospettive, Il Mulino editore, Bologna
Video interviews
(54) Carlo Trazzi: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jy82ZauXCBA&t=23s
(55) Mario Veronesi 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xzSUjTRmDyI
(56) Mario Veronesi 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7QAJiWTSniY
(57) Mario Veronesi 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3mmWHTGGRo
(58) Libero Luppi: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nwWb4oZk_FQ&t=454s
(59) Giorgio Bellini: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pj2QiBvR8kg
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Appendix F
Figs. F1–F3.
Fig. F1. Sterilplast's biochemical lab: the first biochemical lab in Mirandola's history (1962).
Source: Mirandola's Biomedical Museum.
Fig. F2. DASCO's first Italian artificial kidney (1965).
Source: Mirandola's Biomedical Museum.
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